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Sinkler and Guerard: Public Corporations

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
HUGER SINKLER

THEoDoim B. GuniAim*
During the period under review, the South Carolina Supreme
Court had before it a variety of questions relating to public corporations. Three of these cases dealt with constitutional debt
limitations, and two of them dealt with a claimant's right to
recover damages from a municipality. In addition, the court considered the license ordinance of the city of Columbia and an
ordinance of the city of Charleston making it unlawful to sell
beer during specified periods of time.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LuirrATIONs

The three cases to be considered under this heading cover a
wide field. In one the court strictly interpreted the provisions
of the South Carolina Constitution relating to its amendment; in
the second the court considered the effect of a constitutional
amendment after the political entity to which it related had been
abolished; and in the third the court considered the constitutionality of a legislative scheme whereby a county's debt limitation is used to provide funds for a school district.
Amendatory Provisions of Constitution Strictly Construed
Gebktardt v. McGinty' was a declaratory judgment action
brought to obtain an interpretation of article XVI of the South
Carolina Constitution which sets forth the procedure to be followed to ratify the constitution.
Article XVI provides that an amendment may be proposed in
the senate or the house; and, if it is agreed to by two-thirds of
the members elected to each house, the amendment shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the state in the next general
election for representatives. If the election results favorably and
a majority of each branch of the next general assembly shall
ratify the amendment, the same shall become a part of the constitution. However, section 1 of article XVI ends with the following proviso which gave rise to the issues here:
* Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. Gebhardt v. McGinty, 243 S.C. 495, 134 S.E.2d 749 (1964).
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Provided, That such amendment or amendments shall
have been read three times, on three several days, in each
House.
In question was an amendment to article X, section 5, which
was proposed by the 1960 General Assembly in order to remove
Beaufort County and its political subdivisions from the eight per
cent constitutional debt limitation. The amendment read as
follows:
Provided, That the limitations imposed by this section,
or by any other constitutional provision, limiting the amount
of bonded indebtedness which may be incurred by a political
subdivision of this State shall not apply to the County of
Beaufort or to any political subdivision within such county.
By virtue of the said amendment the Forest Beach Public
Service District Commission in Beaufort County sought to issue
bonds in excess of the eight per cent debt limitation otherwise
applicable. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the issuance of these
bonds on the grounds that the act passed by the 1962 General
Assembly for the purpose of ratifying the said amendment did
not meet the requirements of section XVI of the South Carolina
Constitution and in particular the requirements of the proviso
quoted above.
The 1962 ratifying act referred to the amendment only by
reference to the proposing resolution, and the amendment did
not appear in the ratifying act in the very words in which it was
set forth in the proposing resolution. The plaintiff contended
that the proviso of article XVI required that the amendment
sought to be ratified be set forth in haec verba in the ratifying
act and that failure to do so rendered the attempted ratification
invalid. The circuit court held that the ratifying act referred to
the amendment involved and met the requirements of article
XVI.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the circuit court
and held that article XVI requires a ratifying act to set forth
the amendment under consideration in haec verba. In reaching
this conclusion the court took note of the fact that, since the
adoption of the Constitution of 1868, the legislature, when seeking to ratify an amendment to the constitution, with the exception of the act here under attack, had undertaken to set forth
the amendment in the ratifying act in the exact language of the
proposing resolution.
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Thus the rule which permits the general assembly to validly
enact a statute by reference does not apply in the case of a constitutional amendment. The court noted:
That the dangers of amending the constitution by reference
are much greater than those involved with ordinary legislation should be readily apparent, since ordinary legislation
may be quickly amended or repealed by the same or a succeeding general assembly, while a constitutional amendment,
of course,2 cannot and should not be so readily or quickly
changed.

The respondents unsuccessfully contended that the "enrolled
act rule" applied to the controversy here. That rule is concisely
stated as follows:
[W]hen an act has been duly signed by the presiding officers of the general assembly, in open session in the senate
and house, approved by the governor of the state, and duly
deposited in the office of the secretary of state, it is sufficient evidence, nothing to the contrary appearing upon its
face, that it passed the general assembly, and that it is not
competent, either by the journals of the two houses, or either
of them, or by any other evidence, to impeach such an act.3
In rejecting this contention, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that there was no question here regarding the passage of the
ratification act, but that it was apparent that the act did not
comply with section I of article XVI of the South Carolina Constitution. Hence "the enrolled act rule is clearly not applicable."
Special Constitutional Amendment "Repealed" by
Legislative Oonsolidation
Miller v. Farr4 was a declaratory judgment action brought by
a taxpayer-elector of an area which had been included within
Union School District No. 11 before it was abolished in 1952.
The purpose of the action was to determine the constitutionality
of an act authorizing the county board of education of Union
County to issue general obligation bonds of the school district of
Union County, an area co-extensive in area with Union County
2. Id. at 502, 134 S.E.2d at 753.
3. Id. at 501, 134 S.E.2d at 752, quoting from State ex rel. Hoover v. Town
Council of Chester, 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752 (1893).

4. Miller v. Farr, 243 S.C. 342, 133 S.E.2d 838 (1963).
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itself and created in 1952 by the consolidation of all school districts in Union County.
Prior to the consolidation, Union School District No. 11 was
one of the several school districts in Union County. An amendment to article X, section 5, of the South Carolina Constitution,
ratified February 19, 1949, provided that the eight per cent debt
limitation otherwise applicable did not apply to the then existing
Union School District No. 11, but that Union School District
No. 11 could issue bonds in an amount not to exceed twenty per
cent of the value of all taxable property therein. The amendment
also required that the qualified electors of School District No. 11
vote favorably upon the issuance of any of its bonds.
It was the provision of the constitutional amendment requiring
an election that gave rise to the issue before the court in this
appeal. Although the corporate existence of Union School District No. 11 had been terminated by the 1952 consolidation, the
appellant contended that the said constitutional amendment
entitled the persons residing in the area formerly constituting
such district to the protection of an election as a prerequisite
to the issuance of bonds by or for the benefit of any public agency
operating the public school system within the former school
district. Therefore, they argued that the 1952 consolidation act
was subject to such constitutional limitation or condition.
The circuit court entered judgment adverse to the taxpayerelector, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The
court considered the question of legislative intent in the proposing and ratifying of the constitutionl amendment. It noted that
the amendment does not propose to affect any other school district in Union County except Union School District No. 11, nor
does it apply to any other agency than the said Union School
District No. 11. The opinion quotes with approval from Walker
v. Bennett,5 which held that, upon consolidation of several school
districts, the entity of the former district as such was destroyed
and that the constitutional debt limitation was extinguished as
far as the former districts were concerned and related only to
the consolidated district. The court found no difficulty in extending the principle of the Walker case to apply in the case
of the special constitutional amendment requiring an election.
The court noted that the amendment here was adopted subsequent to the Walker decision and that it was, therefore, presumed
5. Walker v. Bennett, 125 S.C. 389, 118 S.E. 779 (1923).
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that those who brought about the adoption of the amendment
were familiar with the Walker case. Therefore, the court concluded that, if it had been their intent to give the constitutional
amendment the effect argued for by the appellant, the general
assembly would have made it clear that the provision requiring
voter approval would be applied not only to the then existing
Union School District No. 11 but to any district or political
entity into which it might thereafter be merged.
Finally, the court called attention to the fact that the amendment here relates to article X, section 5, which provides constitutional debt limitation, clearly indicating that the purpose of
the amendment considered in the light of the article and section
amended was merely to affect the debt limitation which would
otherwise apply.
The South Carolina Supreme Court distinguished the situation
here from that involved in the case of Connor v. CharlestonIigh
,School Dist.6 There the court struck down an act which was
passed with the intent and purpose of circumventing the constitutional amendment applicable to Charleston school district and
to that end had authorized an existing school district under a
new name to issue bonds in excess of the limit prescribed in the
constitutional provisions affecting the same area.
County Aid to School District Upheld
The school district of Jasper County is co-extensive in area
with Jasper County and resulted from the consolidation of several former school districts into a single unit in 1952. The school
district is subject to the eight per cent constitutional debt limitation applicable to school districts in general. The school district's
trustees felt that it was necessary to undertake a school improvement program within the district, involving an expenditure of
approximately 800,000 dollars in order to equalize education opportunities throughout the district. The eight per cent constitutional debt limitation, however, limited the school district's
ability to issue bonds to approximately 300,000 dollars.
In 1953, the general assembly authorized Jasper County to
issue county bonds in the amount of 500,000 dollars and to turn
the proceeds of the bond sale over to the school district to complete its improvement program.
6. 191 S.C. 412, 4 S.E2d 431 (1939).
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The plaintiff in Grey v. Vaigneur7 instituted this declaratory
judgment action for the purpose of having the court adjudicate
whether the legislative scheme which involved the use of Jasper
County's credit to provide funds for the school district was constitutional. Specifically, plaintiff urged that the legislative
scheme was unconstitutional in that (1) the sale of the bonds
would not be for a corporate purpose of Jasper County since
the duty to operate the school system rests upon the school district and not upon the county, and (2) that the effect of the
scheme is to permit the school district by indirection to incur
bonded debt prohibited by the constitutional debt limitation applicable to the school district. The lower court sustained the constitutionality of the legislation in question and, on appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The principal issue before the court was whether a county is
restricted by sections 5 and 6 of article X of the South Carolina
Constitution from issuing bonds to assist a school district coextensive in area with county in the construction of public school
facilities. Section 5 of article X provides that the corporate
authorities of counties may be vested with the power to assist and
collect taxes "for corporate purposes"; and section 6 of article X
restricts the general assembly's power to authorize a county
to levy a tax or issue bonds to those purposes specifically set
forth in section 6. One of the permitted purposes specified in
section 6 is "educational purposes."
The court reiterated the proposition that the school district is
the governmental unit to which is devolved the primary duty of
administering the school system in Jasper County.
However, the court found nothing in the constitution which
would limit the county's right to issue bonds for educational
purposes only to those situations in which the county itself operated the public school system and, therefore, concluded that
the bonds here were specifically permitted by section 6 of article
X. The fact here that the general assembly has seen fit to authorize the expenditure of the funds through the co-extensive school
district related, the court held, only to the method adopted by

the general assembly and not to the purpose for which the bonds
are to be issued. Furthermore, the court noted that Jasper County "has an interest in promoting and providing for the education
of its citizens" and that, therefore, the school improvement pro7. Grey v. Vaigneur, 243 S.C. 604, 135 S.E.2d 229 (1964).
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gram here could properly be accomplished through the joint
efforts of the county and the school district.
It should be noted that the situation here involved a school
district co-extensive in area with the county, a situation materially different from that before the court in the case of Moseley
,V. Velch,8 where the court struck down as unconstitutional a
legislative enactment authorizing Williamsburg County to assume the debt of some of the several school districts within Williamsburg County. The vice in the Moselcy case was that the

taxpayers of debt free school districts would be called upon to
pay debts incurred by other school districts.
Finally, the court found nothing wrong in the use of the
county's debt limitation to provide funds for the school district.
The court further noted that, while the county and the school
district are co-extensive in area, they are separate and distinct
corporate entities and are separately subject to the constitutional
debt limitation applicable to each.
LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPALITY

"PersonalInjuries" Includes Loss of Consortium
Sossan.an v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.0 involved two separate
actions which were consolidated on appeal. The respondents were
man and wife and each brought an action as a result of an accident involving a station wagon operated by the wife and a school
bus belonging to a Cherokee County school district. In the wife's
complaint, she sought damages in the amount of 7000 dollars for
personal injuries and property damage for the alleged gross
negligence and recklessness on the part of the school bus driver.
Section 21-840 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, provides for insurance coverage to protect members of the general
public who are injured by the negligent operation of a school
bus and limits recovery to 5000 dollars "for any one person" not
riding on a school bus who suffers "personal injuries . . .be-

cause of the negligent operation of any such school bus." This
section also limits recovery to actual damages and imposes a 5000
dollar limit for property damage.
The appellant, the insurance carrier for the school district,
had unsuccessfully moved before the trial judge to strike from
the complaint all allegations of "gross negligence and reckless8. Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 39 S.E.2d 133 (1946).

9. 243 S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87 (1964).
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ness" on the grounds that such allegations were irrelevant and
improper and not in conformity with the statute which limited
recovery to actual damages. The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the trial court's refusal to grant such a motion was
error but further held that, in the event of a plea of contributory
negligence on the part of the appellant, the respondent would
have a right to show reckless, wilful and wanton conduct on the
part of the appellant.
There are a number of additional questions relating to pleadings considered on this appeal which will be more properly covered under another heading. However, of significance as far as
this topic is concerned, is the court's decision regarding the right
of the husband to recover under the said code section for loss of
consortium resulting from injury to his wife.
The court recognized that a husband generally is entitled to
recover damages for loss of consortium resulting from negligent
injury to his wife. The question was, however, whether, under
the applicable code section which provided for recovery only
by one "who suffers personal injuries," the husband would be
entitled to recover for loss of consortium.
The court held that the term "personal injury" is broader and
more comprehensive than the term "bodily injury," and that
the language of the statute included an action for loss of consortium.
The holding here should be compared with the court's holding
in Hollifield v. Keller.'0 There it considered the right of a husband to recover for loss of consortium against a municipality
under section 47-70 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962,
as a result of injuries allegedly sustained by his wife through a
defect in the street. Section 47-70 refers to "any person who shall
receive bodily injury or damages in his person or property. ....)
In the Hollifield decision, the court held that the language of
section 47-70 does not authorize an action against a municipality
for loss of consortium and therefore the husband's right to
recover on that account was denied.
Statute Permitting Suit Against City Strictly Construed
Section 47-71 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, provides, as a condition precedent to instituting an action against a
city for personal injuries thereunder, "a claim duly verified shall
10. 238 S.C. 584, 121 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
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be filed with such municipal corporation within three months
after the date of such injury or damage on action commenced
within such time on a verified complaint. ....
.

The plaintiff in Coohran ,v.
City of Sumter1 was allegedly
injured when an automobile driven by a captain on the city of
Sumter police force struck a ladder on which the plaintiff was
standing thus causing the plaintiff to fall heavily to the ground
and resulting in his injury.
The complaint admitted that no verified claim for damages
was filed within ninety days. The city of Sumter demurred, alleging that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the city for the reason that the complaint admitted plaintiff's failure to file a verified claim or a
summons and complaint within the time prescribed by statute.
The circuit court overruled the demurrer and the city of Sumter
appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and held that statutes permitting suits against a political subdivision of the state are in derogation of its sovereignty and
therefore must be strictly construed. The court further held that
the statute was clear and unambiguous in its details and that the
complaint clearly showed that the plaintiff had failed to comply
with the conditions upon which the municipality may be sued.
The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact
that the captain of the police force who allegedly caused the
accident was charged with the duty of investigating and reporting the facts to the city. The court held that this fact did not
establish any waiver or estoppel against the city to assert the
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of section 47-71
as a defense.
Furthermore, although no verified claim was filed, plaintiff
through his counsel had notified the city manager of his claim
by letter within about twenty-seven days of the injury and the
city manager was thereafter advised at intervals of plaintiff's
progress. The court, however, held that such notification did not
meet the requirements of the statute that "a claim duly certified"
shall be filed.
This decision is in keeping with other recent holdings of the
South Carolina Supreme Court strictly interpreting statutes
permitting suits against a municipality. 12
11. 242 S.C. 382, 131 S.E.2d 153 (1963).

12. Hollifield v. Keller, 238 S.C. 584, 121 S.E.2d 213 (1961); Pinkston v,

Morrall, 236 S.C. 601, 115 S.E.2d 286 (1960).
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INTERPRETED

The appeal in Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. City of Columbia1" was
from an order of the lower court granting motions to strike certain defenses set forth by the defendant city of Columbia. The
issue involved was the right of the city of Columbia under its
ordinances and state statutes to impose an annual business license
on the plaintiff insurance companies in excess of 2500 dollars
each.
The plaintiff's insurance companies instituted separate suits
against the city of Columbia to recover sums paid under protest
for municipal business licenses. Paragraph 4 of the answers
of the city of Columbia alleged that a separate license was required for each agency; that in 1954 an agreement was reached
whereby the plaintiffs would give to the city a list of its numerous agencies and the total gross premiums collected by each
and that the city would then issue one license covering all agencies; that it was also agreed that the one license so issued would
be considered the same as if a separate license had been issued to
the plaintiffs for each of those agencies; and that the license
fees of which the plaintiffs complained in this action were paid
in accordance with the said agreement and that not more than
2500 dollars was charged the plaintiff or any one agency.
In considering the relevancy of the allegations of paragraph 4
of the city's answers, the court analyzed the license ordinance in
question and concluded that the ordinance clearly contemplated
a license tax on the basis of two per cent gross premiums "collected through offices or agents located in the city or collected
on policies written on property located in the city."' 4 The court
further concluded that the maximum amount of such tax which
may be annually imposed on any company is limited to the sum
of 2500 dollars as prescribed by section 47-4071r of the South
Carolina Code of Laws, 1962.
On the basis of this analysis, the court concluded that the allegations of paragraph 4 were properly stricken, and that the
agreement between the plaintiffs and the city relative to the
13. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. City of Columbia, 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d 573
(1963).

14. Id. at 240, 130 S.E.2d at 575.
15. "Cities of over seventy thousand inhabitants, according to the latest
official United States census, may require the payment of such sum of money,
not exceeding $2500, for a license as in their judgement may be just and wise
by any person or corporation engaged or intending to engage in any calling,
business or profession, in whole or in part within the limits of such cities .... "
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manner of the assessment of the taxes was not relevant in view
of the fact that the construction placed thereon by the city authorities was contrary to the clear and plain meaning of the
ordinance. This would be the case even though the plaintiffs had
acquiesced in such construction during the previous years. The
opinion notes that the construction given an ordinance or statute
by those charged with tile duty of executing it is entitled to
weight, but that this doctrine is usually and properly restricted
to cases in which the meaning of the ordinance or statute is really
doubtful.
Paragraph 5 of the city's answers alleged that section 47-407
of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, was unconstitutional
special legislation in violation of article III, section 34, subdivision 9 of the South Carolina Constitution.' 0 Section 47-407
applies only in the case of cities having a population in excess
of 70,000 inhabitants and the city contended that such a classification has no reasonable relation to the purposes and objects to
be obtained by the legislature. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, however, again agreed with the lower court that the allegations of paragraph 5 of the answers were irrelevant and were
properly stricken, inasmuch as it cannot be said that density of
population has no reasonable relation to the fixing of license
taxes. In this connection the opinion notes that in the case of a
smaller city a 2500 dollar limitation would undoubtedly not be
necessary, inasmuch as the tax, graduated as to income, would
be unlikely to reach that figure; but that in the case of a larger
city such a limitation might prove necessary in order to prevent
an unreasonable or unconscionable license tax. Under the circumstances, the court held that the exact line of demarcation between
the classifications of cities to effect such a result was a matter
within the discretion of the legislature.
CITY OF CHARLESTON ORDINANCE REsTICTING
SALE OF BEait UPHELD

Esau Jenkins, the operator of a cafe located in the city of
Charleston, was convicted before the municipal court of the city
of Charleston of a violation of section 3-11 of the Charleston
City Code. These sections make it unlawful for the owner or person in charge of any store, beer parlor, or other place of business
or commercial establishment to sell, give away, or in any manner
16. ". .. where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted. . ."
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dispense or permit the consumption of any wines or malt liquors
in such store, beer parlor, or other place of business or commercial
establishment between the hours of 1:30 A. M. and 7:00 A. M.
W hen the case was called for trial in the municipal court, the
defendant moved to quash and dismiss the warrant upon the
grounds that, under section 4-204 of the Code of Laws of South
Carolina, 1962, he had the right to sell beer at all hours except
between the hours of twelve o'clock midnight on Saturday and
sunrise Monday morning. The motions were refused by the municipal court and the circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court in City of Charlestonv. Jenkins"'
affirmed the circuit court.
Under the provisions of section 4-20418 of the South Carolina
Code of Laws, 1962, a person is prohibited from selling beer
only between the hours of twelve o'clock midnight on Saturday
and sunrise Monday morning. The basic question here involved
the right of the city of Charleston to enact an ordinance more
restrictive than the applicable general law on the subject.
The opinion points out that the city of Charleston under its
charter is empowered and authorized to make and establish
rules, regulations and ordinances ". . . requisite and necessary
for the security, welfare and convenience of the said city or for
preserving peace, order and good government within the same."' 9
This grant of power and authority is also contained in section
47-6120 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, which confers
upon municipalities the authority to exercise police powers.
The only limitations upon the police power delegated by the
state to municipalities are (1) the territorial confines of the
municipality and (2) the proviso that legislation thereunder
shall not be inconsistent with state laws.
17. 243 S.C. 205, 133 S.E.2d 242 (1963).
18. "It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale any wine or
beer in this state between the hours of twelve o'clock Saturday night and
sunrise Monday morning . .. ."
19. City of Charleston v. Jenkins, 243 S.C. 205, 208, 133 S.E.2d 242, 243

(1963).
20. "The city and town councils of the cities and towns of the state shall, in
addition to the powers conferred by their respective charters, have power and
authority to make, ordain and establish all such rules, by-laws, regulations and
ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of this state, respecting the roads,
streets, markets, police, health and order of such cities and towns or respecting
any subject as shall appear to them necessary and proper for the security,
welfare and convenience of such cities and towns or for preserving health, peace,
order and good government within them. And the city and town councils may
fix fines and pefialties for the violation thereof, not exceeding one hundred
dollars' fine or thirty days' imprisonment."
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Here the Charleston City Code imposed additional regulations
upon the operator of any place of business in the city of Charleston engaged in the sale of beer. The South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the city ordinance was not in conflict with the
provisions of the South Carolina Code and its enactment was
within the power of the city.
In reaching this conclusion, the court reiterated the general
rules that, in order for a conflict to exist between a state enactment and a municipal regulation:
[B]oth must contain either express or implied conditions
which are inconsistent and irreconcilable with each other
... If either is silent where the other speaks, there can be
no conflict between them. Where no conflict exists both laws
stand .... 21
As a general rule additional regulations to that of the state
law does not constitute a conflict therewith. .

.

. [M]erely

because a municipal ordinance is not as broad as the22statute
does not render it so inconsistent as to make it void.
In the instant case, the court found that the exercise of the
police power by the city of Charleston, in adopting the ordinance
involved here, was reasonable, proper and valid and was designed
"to preserve the peace, order and good government within the
City.))

21. City of Charleston v. Jenldns, 243 S.C. 205, 210, 133 S.E.2d 242, 244

(1963).
22. Ibid.
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